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FOREWORD
Article II: The Uses and Abuses
of Executive Power
ELIZABETH M. IGLESIAS*
This issue of the University of Miami Law Review is comprised of
papers delivered during the live proceedings of the Law Review's annual
symposium held on February 24, 2007. The symposium, entitled Article
II: The Uses and Abuses of Executive Power, was organized to create a
venue for legal scholars and practitioners to engage in sustained analysis
of the scope and significance of the Bush administration's invocation of
Article II of the U.S. Constitution as legal authority for its warrantless
surveillance program, its authorization of "harsh interrogation tech-
niques," extraordinary renditions, indefinite detentions, military com-
missions, and other assertions of executive power that incrementally and
now cumulatively have come to define the administration's global War
on Terror.' The idea for this symposium was originally inspired by the
proceedings of a remarkable hearing before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on March 31, 2006, entitled An Examination of the Call to Cen-
* Professor of Law and Director, University of Miami School of Law Center for Hispanic
and Caribbean Legal Studies. Thanks to the Honorable Elizabeth Holtzman for providing an
example of professional courage, to University of Miami President Donna Shalala for supporting
this conference, to Projects Editor Kelly Feig for her administrative skills and unfailing grace
under pressure, to Editor in Chief Todd Allison for the good cheer with which he deploys
unparalleled diplomacy, to my colleagues Ken Casebeer, Marnie Mahoney, Mario Barnes, Steve
Vladeck, Zanita Fenton, David Abraham, Steve Schnably, and Rick Williamson for the excellence
of their substantive contributions to the live discussions and written record of this important
conference, and most importantly, to Madeleine M. Plasencia, for her unwavering friendship,
brilliant insights, and substantial contributions to the conference proceedings and the production
of this foreword.
1. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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sure the President.2 The hearing was organized and chaired by U.S.
Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) in response to a resolution proposed by
Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) to censure President George W. Bush
for secretly authorizing the National Security Agency to engage in war-
rantless electronic surveillance in violation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.'
The committee's censure hearing had its own origin and context.
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times published a story revealing
the existence of the Bush administration's warrantless electronic surveil-
lance program.4 On December 19, 2007, the President held a press con-
ference in which he confirmed that he had authorized the surveillance
program,5 and thereafter Bush officials asserted various legal arguments
in support of the President's actions including assertions that Congress
had in fact authorized the surveillance program through the Authoriza-
tion for the Use of Military Force and, equally if not more provocatively,
that the President did not need statutory authority to conduct warrantless
surveillance as part of his global War on Terror because he had inherent
authority to do so under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.6
This was not the first time, nor the last, that the Bush administra-
tion would seek to use Article II as legal justification for extraordinary
assertions of executive power in connection with its global War on Ter-
ror. Internal legal memos released by the Justice Department in June
2004, as well as legal arguments advanced before the Supreme Court in
2. An Examination of the Call To Censure the President: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/censure.
html [hereinafter An Examination of the Call To Censure the President].
3. S. Res. 398, 109th Cong., 152 CONG. REc. S2041-01 (2006).
4. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
5. Press Release, White House, Press Conference of the President (Dec. 19, 2005), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html.
6. Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and
General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-I .html. Attorney
General Gonzales explained,
[W]e believe signals intelligence is . . . a fundamental incident of war, and we
believe [it] has been authorized by the Congress. . . . even though signals
intelligence is not mentioned in the authorization to use force ....
I might also add that we also believe the President has the inherent authority under
the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in this kind of activity.
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 7 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld8 reveal Article II argu-
ments underlying a breathtaking array of asserted executive powers,
including the power to classify individuals, indeed entire groups, as
"unlawful enemy combatants"; to order indefinite detentions of citizens
and noncitizens alike both within and beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States; to create military tribunals and establish trial proce-
dures in violation of otherwise applicable treaties and statutes; to sus-
pend the Geneva Conventions; to ignore even peremptory norms of
customary international law, and to buttress claims that application of
the federal antitorture statute to interrogations performed under the
authority of the commander in chief would infringe upon the President's
Article II powers.9 Against this backdrop, the Bush administration's
resort to Article II for legal justification to head off the gathering scandal
over its secret domestic surveillance program was hardly surprising.
What was surprising was the censure hearing held in the Senate
Judiciary Committee on Friday, March 31, 2006. Here was a Republi-
can-controlled committee of the Republican-controlled Senate examin-
ing a call to censure a Republican President at the request of a
Democratic Senator. Could it be the President had gone too far even for
his own party? The five Republicans at the hearing clearly outnumbered
Senators Leahy and Feingold, the only two Democrats present. Did this
mean that constitutional principle was poised to surge over party inter-
est? If so, where then were Senators Kennedy, Biden, Feinstein, and
Schumer?1" Surely they would want to be present for so momentous a
turning point, or was this hearing a political stunt-a staged event for
political consumption by the American people? And if so, to what end?
Was it designed to assure us that constitutional checks and balances had
survived the consolidation of a one party government? A public per-
formance of intra-party conflict orchestrated to create the illusion of
interbranch accountability-a tempest in the teapot of a censure resolu-
tion. What, after all, was the significance of a censure resolution in the
7. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ("The Government maintains that no explicit congressional
authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to
Article II of the Constitution. We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such
authority, however, because we agree with the Government's alternative position, that Congress
has in fact authorized Hamdi's detention .... ).
8. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also Brief for Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006) (No. 05-184).
9. See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 3-380 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel, eds. 2005).
10. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Call To Censure Is Answered by a Mostly Empty Echo,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at All; Dana Milbank, The Feingold Resolution and the Sound of
Silence, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 4272031; David Welna, Sen.
Feingold Finds Little Support in Censure Motion, NPR.oRo, Mar. 31, 2006, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=5316457.
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Senate's Judiciary Committee when, outside the committee, the ever
louder call was for impeachment?"
A sticking point during the censure hearing was not so much the
warrantless surveillance program, itself, as the legal theory the Bush
administration had advanced in support of the program. Senator Fein-
gold, the proponent of the call for censure, put the matter quite starkly:
[I]f the President has the inherent authority to authorize whatever sur-
veillance he thinks is necessary, then he surely will ignore [any future
legislation] just as he has ignored FISA on many, many occasions.
If the President's legal theory ...is correct, then FISA is a dead
letter. All of the supposed protections for civil liberties contained in
the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act that we just passed are a
cruel hoax, and any future legislation we might pass regarding sur-
veillance or national security is a waste of time and a charade. Under
this theory, we no longer have a constitutional system consisting of
three coequal branches of Government. We have a monarchy.'
2
In Feingold's view, the legal arguments advanced in support of the
President's warrantless domestic surveillance program not only raise
questions about the scope of the President's inherent powers under Arti-
cle II and the relationship between those powers and the powers of Con-
gress under Article I and the Judiciary under Article III, but also-and
more fundamentally-place in doubt the President's commitment to be
governed by the rule of law. 3 Accordinaly, in Feingold's view, a reso-
lution of censure was a necessary step for the Senate to avoid complicity
in the President's lawlessness and resist his efforts to dismantle the con-
stitutional structure of American government: "None of us here can pre-
dict how history will view this current episode, but I do hope that 30
years from now this Senate will not be seen to have backed down in the
face of such a grave challenge to our constitutional system." 4
11. See, e.g., Sarah Baxter, 'Impeach Bush' Chorus Grows, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Mar.
19, 2006, at 29, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article742744.ece;
Elizabeth Holtzman, The Impeachment of George W. Bush, THE NATION, Jan. 30, 2006, at 11,
available at http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20060130&s=holtzman; Garrison
Keillor, Impeach Bush, SALON.COM, Mar. 1, 2006, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/
03/01/keillor; National Briefing New England: Vermont: Senate Says, Impeach Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2007, at A12; National Briefing West: California: Push To Impeach Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2006, at A22.
12. An Examination of the Call To Censure the President, supra note 2 (statement of Senator
Russ Feingold, Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
13. Id. ("We can fight terrorism without breaking the law. The rule of law is central to who
we are as a people, and the President must return to the law. He must acknowledge and be held
accountable for his illegal actions, and also for misleading the American people both before and




Despite the high rhetoric and spectacular performances by some
members of the committee, the censure hearing produced no censure
resolution. This hearing was, however, the single most immediate and
direct influence that inspired me to imagine and, thereafter, to organize a
symposium exploring the uses and abuses of executive power in the
Bush administration's global War on Terror. This is because the hearing
raised more questions than it answered. To me, the viewer, the censure
hearing had the air of a choreographed performance by Senate actors
whose institutional capacity to enforce constitutional limits on aggres-
sive assertions of executive power was placed in serious doubt by a
spectacle of their own production.' 5 The rhetorical maneuvers deployed
at the hearing obfuscated and confused every major issue the hearing
was called to examine, not least of which was the fundamental issue
whether the President should be censured.' 6
This Law Review issue constitutes a written record of a conference
organized to examine questions the Senate Judiciary Committee's Cen-
sure Hearing left unanswered and, in some instances, unasked. It opens
with a contribution by the Honorable Elizabeth Holtzman delivered as
the conference keynote presentation. Unlike Senator Lindsay Graham,
who during the censure hearing repeatedly refused to recognize any his-
torical parallels that might justify a Senate censure of the President,' 7 in
Holtzman's view historical parallels to the Nixon administration are not
only obvious, but compelling reasons, not merely for censure, but for
impeachment of the President.
15. See An Examination of the Call To Censure the President, supra note 2. Senator Patrick
Leahy, Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, stated,
[B]ecause the Republican-controlled Congress has not conducted real oversight, and
because the attempts that this Committee had made on oversight have been
stonewalled by the administration, we don't know the extent of the administration's
domestic spying activities. But we know that the administration has secretly spied
on Americans without attempting to comply with FISA, and we know that the legal
justifications it has offered ... are patently flimsy.
I therefore have no hesitation in condemning the President for secretly and
systematically violating the laws of the United States of America. I have no doubt
that such a conclusion will be history's verdict. History will evaluate how diligently
the Republican-controlled Congress performed the oversight duties envisioned by
the Founders. As of this moment, history's judgment of the diligence and resolve of
the Republican-controlled Congress is unlikely to be kind.
Id.
16. For an extended critical analysis of the proceedings of this censure hearing, see Elizabeth
M. Iglesias, The Spectacle of Censure (forthcoming 2008) (on file with the author).
17. An Examination of the Call To Censure the President, supra note 2 ("My point is this is
apples and oranges. Anybody who believes that Richard Nixon was relying on some inherent
authority argument to allow himself to break into a political opponent is recreating history. This
debate is about when does the power of the President begin and end in a time of war. This is an
honest, sincere debate.").
20081
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Holtzman's speech, entitled Abuses of Presidential Power:
Impeachment as a Remedy, centers on the President's constitutional duty
to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed," a charge that requires
the President to both "take care" to execute the laws and to do so "faith-
fully."18 Having served as a member of the House Judiciary Committee
that undertook impeachment proceedings against President Richard M.
Nixon, Holtzman is acutely aware of the constitutional imperative
underlying the impeachment process. She reminds us that the impeach-
ment power was specifically provided for in the Constitution as an
important protection against abuses of power by officials, whose posi-
tions in high office might otherwise render them above the law. 9
Reviewing the gamut of abuses constituting "high crimes and mis-
demeanors," Holtzman draws historical parallels between the abuses of
the Nixon administration and the conduct of the federal government
under the current Bush administration. According to Holtzman, illegal
surveillance of political enemies, the use of governmental agencies to
harass opponents and dissenters, failure to correct false testimony by the
attorney general are common themes of abuse that mar both the Nixon
and the Bush administrations. 20 Beyond noting such historical parallels,
Holtzman outlines four instances in which she believes that President
Bush's failure to discharge his constitutional duty to "take care" and do
so "faithfully," whether taken together or separately, constitute impeach-
able offenses: (1) the unilateral invocation of domestic national security
wiretapping in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (FISA);2 1 (2) the campaign of disinformation and lies designed to
deceive Congress and the American people into approving a war in Iraq
after the attacks of September 11 ;22 (3) the failure to take care that laws
requiring the humane treatment and prohibiting the torture of persons
detained under the authority of the United States are faithfully exe-
cuted;23 and (4) his gross failure to implement and faithfully execute
hurricane relief following the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina.24
18. Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, Abuses of Presidential Power: Impeachment as a Remedy, 62
U. MIAMI L. REV. 213, 216-17 (2008).
19. Id. at 213-16.
20. Id.
21. Id at 215-18. For a review of arguments at issue in pending litigation challenging the
legality of the NSA warrantless surveillance program, see Michael Avery, The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Electronic Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to the National Security of the
United States, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541 (2008) (drawing on arguments and briefs produced by
team of lawyers representing plaintiffs challenging the surveillance program in Center for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006)).
22. Id. at 218-23.
23. Id. at 223-24.
24. Id. at 225-26.
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Writing independently, Professors Dorothy Roberts and David
Abraham see other historical parallels reflected in the activities through
which the Bush administration has prosecuted its global War on Terror.
For Roberts, images of torture and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib recall
disturbing images from a not so distant American past in which white
supremacy achieved racialized dominance through suspension of the
rule of law for people of African descent." In unflinching and vivid
detail, Roberts recounts the violence directed at African Americans in
slave-holding and Jim Crow America. Scenes of American soldiers
engaged in extraterritorial torture at Abu Ghraib recall earlier scenes of
spectacle lynchings. z6 Pointing to the torture culture evidenced by the
images from Abu Ghraib, Roberts notes the lynching iconography of
nooses, hooded and naked shackled bodies, and dogs depicted in these
images. Roberts explains, "As spectacle lynchings validated white
beliefs about black subjection and criminality, the familiar images of
torture in Abu Ghraib helped to construct the racialized terrorist in the
public imagination."27
The current milieu created by the Bush administration's global War
on Terror is one in which the brutal treatment of persons cast as "unlaw-
ful enemy combatants" is justified in moral and political terms. The
objective and effect of these justifications is to desensitize and accultur-
ate the American people to torture: a phenomenon Roberts calls the
"normalization of torture," and sees evidenced in reported findings that
only one-third of Americans believe that the abuses at Abu Ghraib con-
stitute torture.28 Roberts argues that this desensitization is produced
through the racialization of persons cast as enemy combatants, and that
torture is one of the practices through which this racialization is
achieved.29
In a similar vein, Professor Madeleine Plasencia's remarks urged
conference attendees to consider the implications of the photos produced
at Abu Ghraib. Drawing on Susan Sontag's book Regarding the Pain of
Others, Plasencia noted how the circulation of these gruesome images
worked to shrivel sympathy and neutralize the moral implications of the
brutality captured by the photos and videos-certainly among the
soldiers involved in their production.3" These remarks, in turn, call to
mind the work of the philosopher Hannah Arendt. Writing of the Holo-
25. Dorothy Roberts, Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 229, 230
(2008).
26. Id. at 231-34.
27. Id. at 234.
28. Id. at 244.
29. Id. at 240.
30. See Madeleine M. Plasencia & Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Righting the Wrongs of Others:
2008]
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caust, Arendt noted the crucial role of brutality in legitimating the con-
solidation and deployment of totalitarian power:
No conceivable chronicle of any kind could succeed in turning six
million dead people into a political argument. The attempt of the
Nazis to fabricate a wickedness beyond vice did nothing more than
establish an innocence beyond virtue....
Yet Nazi policy, realized best in the phony world of propaganda,
was well served by the fabrication. Had the Nazis been content
merely to draw up a bill of indictment against the Jews and propagan-
dize the notion that there are subhuman and superhuman peoples,
they would hardly have succeeded in convincing common sense that
the Jews were subhuman. Lying was not enough. In order to be
believed, the Nazis had to fabricate reality itself and make Jews look
subhuman. So that even today, when faced by the atrocity films,
common sense will say: "But don't they look like criminals?" Or, if
incapable of grasping an innocence beyond virtue and vice, people
will say: "What terrible things these Jews must have done to have the
Germans do this to them!
' 31
The connection Roberts draws between the torture scandal at Abu
Ghraib and the history of racial terror directed at African Americans in
this country raises significant questions about the political agenda under-
lying efforts to desensitize the American people to torture-even as
Arendt's reflections on the way the Nazi regime managed to legitimate
itself through the horrors produced by its inhuman brutality provide apt
reminder that this logic has no necessary stopping point. Nevertheless,
the fact that the deployment of brute power creates conditions in which
third party observers are led to accept the subhumanity of the brutalized
persons may describe the process through which desensitization is
achieved, but it does not tell us why this desensitization is pursued.
What exactly is the agenda driving our leader's effort to "normalize"
torture?
In this vein, Professor David Abraham's article provides much to
consider.32 Abraham links the Bush administration's rhetoric and poli-
cies in the global War on Terror to the rhetoric and policies of the Nazi
regime.33 Though many in this country may balk, quite violently, at any
suggestion that America may be careening toward dictatorship, Abra-
ham sees mounting and irrefutable evidence that the fascist state that
Signing Statements, Superheroes and the Spectacle of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 in
Critical Perspective (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with authors).
31. Hannah Arendt, The Image of Hell, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDNG: 1930-1954, at 197,
199 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005) (1994).
32. David Abraham, The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of
Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MiAmi. L. REV. 249 (2008).
33. See id. at 256-69.
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arose in Europe in 1933 bears an uncanny resemblance to the legal,
political, and rhetorical moves being made in the United States under the
Bush administration. First and foremost, Bush's platform as a presiden-
tial candidate was to dismantle the welfare state, revive the legacy of
Ronald Reagan, and empower the rich and religious in the name of tradi-
tional values. However, since Bush's presidency was "never democrati-
cally attained," its ability to achieve the objectives for which he was
never elected "depend[ed] on the construction of a grave terrorist
threat."34 Once the September 11 attacks occurred, Bush's presidency
began in earnest, as he declared that "my most important job as your
President is to defend the homeland. 35
Abraham sees a nonrandom coincidence between Bush's articula-
tion of his own President-as-prophet role and the emergence in European
fascism of the image of the mystical, charismatic, personalistic Execu-
tive whose election by the whole nation, rather than the parts represented
in the national assembly, rendered him the only true repository of the
nation's sovereignty, and placed him above the law in times of emer-
gency. Abraham draws a direct link between the rhetoric deployed by
the President and the philosophy articulated by the Nazi legal scholar
Carl Schmitt. In response to critics of Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld in 2006, Bush said this: "I hear the voices, and I read the front
page, and I know the speculation. But I'm the decider, and I decide
what is best."36 In Abraham's view, Bush's proclamation of himself as
the "Decider" has historical and political significance much deeper and
more alarming than that reflected in the amused reaction of the popular
press and pundits, who dismissed it as the awkward tantrum of a gram-
matically challenged neophyte. In Schmitt's legal philosophy, the sov-
ereign is he who decides on the state of exception.37
Against this more historically informed backdrop, Bush's procla-
mation of himself as Decider conjures the specter of two equally alarm-
ing positions. The first is the notion that Bush has claimed for himself
34. Id. at 261.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 265 n.86.
37. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15-16 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1998). Schmitt writes that:
The exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but
it simultaneously reveals a specifically juridical formal element: the decision in
absolute purity .... There is no rule that is applicable to chaos. Order must be...
created, and sovereign is he who definitely decides if this situation is actually
effective. . . .He has the monopoly over the final decision. Therein consists the
essence of State sovereignty, which must therefore be properly juridically defined
not as the monopoly to sanction or to rule but as the monopoly to decide ....
Id. (quoting Carl Schmitt, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 19-22 (George Schwab trans., 1985)) (emphasis added).
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the sovereign power of the people of the United States: a claim whose
legal implications are concretely manifested in assertions of inherent
power to act outside the Constitution and the system of separated powers
it established-the type of claim that induced Senator Feingold to call
for censure.38 Even more pointedly, reading Bush's self-anointment as
Decider against the backdrop of Schmitt's philosophy conjures the eerie
warning that Bush has claimed the power to suspend the Constitution-
to decide on a state of exception. Read in this light, the Bush adminis-
tration's global War on Terror is the back door through which we, as
Americans, can expect to be terrorized, not by outsiders traversing vast
expanses to attack us in our homeland, but by the ever-expanding power
of a sovereign Decider and the specter that constitutional government in
this country will give way to a state of exception of perpetual duration.
The three articles by Professors Stephen Vladeck, Tucker Culbert-
son, Mario Barnes and Attorney Frank Bowman significantly expand
our analysis of the scope of executive power by taking up the issue of
extraterritorial detentions and the treatment of enemy combatants cap-
tured in the global War on Terror. All three articles are important inter-
ventions in ongoing legal debates regarding the constitutional validity of
executive detentions in the global War on Terror. These debates, how-
ever, reflect a radically changed environment in which the unilateral
assertions of executive power advanced in the President's Military Order
of November 13, 2001, 3 9 and thereafter repudiated by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Rasul4 ° and Hamdan,4' have since been superseded
by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA").4 2 The significance
of this changed environment cannot be overstated.
Through the MCA, the Republican-controlled Congress, to a signif-
icant degree, ratified the procedures established unilaterally by the Presi-
dent's Military Order. The MCA purports to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus applications filed by or on behalf
of persons subject to executive detention as unlawful enemy combat-
ants.4 3 Not only does the MCA purport to eliminate federal habeas juris-
38. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
39. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
40. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
41. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
42. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
43. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Section 7(a) amends the
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, by striking the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and inserting the following:
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
[Vol. 62:181
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diction, it also purports to eliminate any other actions through which
federal district courts might be petitioned to review conditions of deten-
tion, alleged mistreatment, or unlawful renditions of persons subject to
executive detention.' The MCA also limits the sources of law that may
be invoked to determine whether detainee rights have been violated.
Significantly, Section 5 of the MCA declares that the Geneva Conven-
tions may not be invoked as a source of rights against the United States
or its agents in U.S. courts.45
Prior to the enactment of the MCA, Hamdan had struck down the
military commissions established pursuant to the President's Military
Order. The Court held that the President's Article II powers do not
include authority to establish military commissions unilaterally46 and
that the procedures established pursuant to the President's Military
Order violated provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"), which conditioned the President's use of military commis-
sions on compliance with American common law of war, the UCMJ,
and the law of nations-most notably, the four Geneva Conventions.47
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an
alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting
such determination.
§ 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
44. Id.
45. § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631-32 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note) (stating that "[n]o
person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other
civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or any current or former officer, employee,
member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in
any court of the United States or its States or territories").
46. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772-73 ("The military commission, a tribunal neither mentioned
in the Constitution nor created by statute, was born of military necessity.... Exigency alone, of
course, will not justify the establishment and use of penal tribunals not contemplated by [the
United States Constitution] unless some other part of that document authorizes a response to the
felt need .... And that authority, if it exists, can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the
President and Congress in time of war.") (emphasis added). The Court went on to quote
extensively from Ex parte Milligan:
[N]either can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper
authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President. ...
Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any
commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the
trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a
controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at least insures acts of
indemnity from the justice of the legislature.
Id. at 2773-74 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).
47. Id. at 2786 ("The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commissions on
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Through the MCA, indefinite executive detentions, trial by military
tribunals pursuant to otherwise constitutionally suspect procedures, and
suspension of federal judicial review are no longer the work of the Presi-
dent acting alone under his asserted Article I powers, but are the joint
work product of the President and the Congress. Accordingly, these
concerted acts are entitled to the highest standard of judicial deference
afforded to acts of government under the framework established by Jus-
tice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.48
From this perspective, enactment of the MCA raises a critically
important concern. Given the heightened deference afforded govern-
ment actions when the President and Congress are acting in concert,
does passage of the MCA make either the constitutionally suspect proce-
dures of the military commissions or the practice of extrajudicial execu-
tive detention constitutional? The answer to this question has significant
implications, given the political reality of a one-party state that was so
dramatically evidenced by the spectacle of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee's Censure Hearing. If fundamental individual rights and constitu-
tional restrictions on federal power are to be discarded whenever the
President and Congress agree to restrict individual rights and ignore con-
stitutional restrictions, then the spectacle of the Censure Hearing is truly
a window into a future where executive impunity and congressional
impotence will be enshrined in the positive laws enacted through the
machinery of a one-party system. Notably, the articles by Professors
Vladeck, Culbertson, and Barnes and Bowman seek to avoid this logical
inference and, equally notably, to do so, they look to the courts.
Professor Stephen Vladeck' s article takes up the issue of the consti-
tutionality of executive detentions by intervening in ongoing debates
regarding the question whether the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Con-
compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ
itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of nations,'-including,
inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. The procedures that the Government has
decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by commission violate these laws.") (citations omitted).
48. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). According to Justice Jackson:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.
If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that
the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure [of private
property] executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might
attack it.
Id. at 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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stitution applies to aliens detained under U.S. power outside the territo-
rial boundaries of the United States. He proceeds by examining, and
ultimately rejecting, the competing positions articulated by Judges Ran-
dolph and Rogers of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Boumediene v. Bush.4 9 Vladeck argues that the debate over the constitu-
tionality of Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which
purports to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions
filed by or on behalf of noncitizens detained abroad under U.S. power, is
fundamentally flawed because both sides have misinterpreted the textual
language of the Suspension Clause and have failed to take proper notice
of the historical context of its initial inclusion in the Constitution or the
significance of subsequent precedential developments. His point of ref-
erence for resolving the constitutional debate is the Framers' intent, and
his methodology is careful analysis of the logical inferences that can
fairly be drawn from broad and narrow readings of judicial precedents
understood in their historical and doctrinal contexts. His points of refer-
ence and methodology underlie the significant strengths of his analysis,
but lead him to discount the full significance of the debate framed by the
competing interpretations of the Suspension Clause in Boumediene.5 °
In Boumediene v. Bush, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals considered arguments on behalf of Guantinamo
detainees. Judge Randolph, writing for himself and Judge Sentelle, held
that the MCA jurisdiction-stripping provisions applied to pending
habeas petitions, such as the ones before the court, did not violate the
Suspension Clause because nonresident aliens have no constitutional
rights outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.51 In her
dissent, Judge Rogers concluded that the MCA did violate the Suspen-
sion Clause because the limitation the Clause imposes on congressional
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus is a structural limitation on
congressional power in all cases, not just in cases involving citizens or
other classes of persons who are recognized rights holders under the
U.S. Constitution.52 Put differently, where Judge Randolph argued that
the Suspension Clause protects only U.S. rights holders, Judge Rogers
argued that the Suspension Clause operates as a fundamental limitation
on federal power, wherever and against whomever the government may
act.
Instead of engaging this debate on its own terms, Vladeck attempts
49. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
50. The Suspension Clause appears in Article I, Section 9: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
51. 476 F.3d at 988-92.
52. Id. at 995-98 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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a sidestep. He asserts that the issue is not whether the Suspension
Clause operates as a structural limit on the power of Congress to sus-
pend habeas corpus or only as a partial limit effectuated through the
judicial enforcement of individual rights that only U.S. rights holders
enjoy.53 This debate is, in Vladeck's view, a false debate because both
sides begin from faulty premises by assuming that the Suspension
Clause is a restriction or limitation on the power of Congress.54 Instead,
he points out that, given its historical origins and development, the
Clause is more properly understood as an affirmative grant of power
specifying the limited circumstances in which Congress may act to sus-
pend the preexisting right of habeas corpus.55 He points to ample histor-
ical evidence documenting original debates over the nature and scope of
the power granted the national government by the new Constitution.56
This evidence points in one direction.
The government created by the Constitution was a government of
strictly limited powers. It was understood to have no powers other than
the powers enumerated by the written text of the Constitution. Against
this backdrop, the Suspension Clause could only have been understood
as a grant of power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of
rebellion or invasion when required by public safety. 7 Absent the Sus-
pension Clause, the federal government would have no power to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus under any circumstance because the
Clause is the only provision in the Constitution that confers this power,
even as it limits it to the specific instances identified by the Clause.58
Presumably, this means that the Suspension Clause applies to the
MCA's suspension of federal courts' habeas jurisdiction over the claims
of aliens detained extraterritorially under U.S. power because, under the
Constitution, Congress can suspend the writ only pursuant to the Sus-
pension Clause.
Vladeck proceeds from this starting point through a systematic,
53. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV.
275, 276 (2008). According to Vladeck, this debate can yield no definitive answer because
"[s]ome provisions of the Constitution are clearly 'structural'; others are clearly 'individual.' The
line dividing the two is elusive at best, if not downright illusory, and supporters of both views of
the Suspension Clause can marshal support for the notion that the Clause falls on either side." Id.
at 602.
54. Id. at 276-78.
55. See id. at 277 ("[T]he Suspension Clause did not create a 'structural right'; it provided
structural constitutional underpinnings for the common-law right that already existed, and
specified the only instances in which that right could be abridged. On this view, both readings of
the Suspension Clause in the D.C. Circuit's Boumediene decision are incorrect because both
presuppose that the relevant question is how the clause limits Congress." (footnote omitted)).
56. See id. at 282-84.




analytical, and historical deconstruction of the obstacles flung in the way
of his thesis by Judge Randolph's opinion in Boumediene. Echoing
Judge Rogers, Vladeck concludes that
[u]nless the writ of habeas corpus ... was categorically unavailable
to noncitizens overseas at common law-and the absence of relevant
case law does not itself answer this question-then the MCA inter-
feres with the common-law writ, and can only do so if it is a valid
exercise of Congress's Suspension Clause power.59
To support this conclusion, Vladeck deploys the classic methodology of
legal reasoning, which proceeds by distinguishing the broad and narrow
holdings of a precedent and choosing the most advantageous reading
that logic and context allow. Vladeck's reading of precedent demon-
strates that the Court could legitimately strike down the MCA as uncon-
stitutional-and he does make a compelling case that a correct
understanding of the historical developments surrounding the right of
habeas corpus and a narrow analytical reading of controlling precedents
in their appropriate historical context provide ample resources to support
such a move. The alarming undercurrent reflected in the Boumediene
debate between Judges Randolph and Rogers must, however, be dealt
with directly.
To dismiss as a false debate the question whether the Suspension
Clause constitutes an absolute limitation on the power of the federal
government or a guarantee to secure the fundamental right to habeas
corpus for a limited class of U.S. rights holders is to ignore the extent to
which the struggle over the nature of federal power-the struggle
between a commitment to republican government based on respect for
the universal rights of man and the historical deployment of despotic
power for the benefit of a privileged faction-has been waged precisely
in terms reflected in the debate between Judges Randolph and Rogers.
In other words, the claimed power to govern persons outside the restric-
tions of constitutional law is a claim to unlimited, arbitrary (sovereign)
power over persons accorded no rights-but at the discretion of the sov-
ereign.6" This is the power Judge Randolph affirms and Judge Rogers
denies. The claimed power to govern persons outside the legal restric-
tions imposed by the Constitution is a claim at odds with the universal
principles of right upon which the Framers purported to ground the
American experiment in enlightened self-government. It is a claim of
power whose historical genealogy hails back to the ignoble, and to this
day still repudiated, decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, where the Court
59. Id. at 303-04.
60. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819) (noting that sovereign
power knows no limitation other than its own discretion).
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concluded that persons of African descent, not being part of the "people
of the United States '' 61 were "governed as subjects with absolute and
despotic power" 62 and had "no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.
63
From this perspective, the debate between Judges Randolph and
Rogers is not a false debate but instead reflects two competing positions
on the scope of federal power that have each found expression at various
points in our history and that repeatedly call into fundamental question
the nature of American government. Put differently, at stake in this
debate is nothing less than the question whether the government created
by our Constitution will govern in the world as the lawless agent of
some increasingly contested locus of sovereignty or whether it will oper-
ate as a government under the rule of law grounded on universal princi-
ples of right. The debate whether the Suspension Clause constitutes a
structural limitation on federal power independent of the rights-bearing
status of the persons targeted by this power or whether its limitations on
the suspension of habeas corpus protect only U.S. rights bearers might
certainly be rhetorically sidestepped by reading the Clause as an affirma-
tive grant of enumerated power limited by the terms of its text, but this
reading cannot sidestep the more fundamental and pervasive issue
reflected in repeated jurisprudential debates over the scope of the federal
government's power to govern outside constitutional limits persons
whom the courts may declare are not part of "the people. 64
In a similar context, Professor Culbertson's article engages the
debate over the rights of persons detained as unlawful enemy combat-
ants in the global War on Terror from a very different perspective.
Rather than grounding access to federal courts on Congress's failure to
invoke the Suspension Clause, Culbertson contends that the Fifth
Amendment restricts governmental power and protects the rights of indi-
vidual detainees, "even and perhaps especially criminal enemy aliens
held abroad-pursuant to domestic and international laws and customs
61. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857).
62. Id. at 409.
63. Id. at 407. The Court also stated,
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and
mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct
the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent
member of this sovereignty.
Id. at 404.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 265, 267 (1990) (finding
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens
in foreign territory or in international waters because nonresident aliens are not part of "the
people" protected by the Fourth Amendment).
[Vol. 62:181
FOREWORD
comprising humanitarian law."65 He proceeds to develop this contention
along two trajectories: The first asserts arguments based on what he calls
the "incorporative universality of humanitarian law"; the second grounds
detainee rights on the "incorporative humanitarianism of the Fifth
Amendment."
As precursor to addressing the scope of Fifth Amendment rights
that he would accord to detainees in the War on Terror, Culbertson
makes a series of arguments regarding the nature of humanitarian law.
On a superficial first reading, it seems that Culbertson is deploying some
version or another of natural law philosophy-ascribing to humanitarian
law a transcendental status insofar as he asserts that humanitarian law
establishes principles of right and of substantive justice that are not only
universal but, in some unspecified way, transcend the particular expres-
sions of these principles in positive law. By humanitarian law, he means
to refer not exclusively to the conventional law of Geneva or the Hague,
but to the underlying policy objectives and methodological foundations
that inform these and other codification efforts. This is because, in his
view, "[a]ny particular enactment of humanitarian law is dependent
upon historical contingencies and is binding only in specific cirucm-
stances,"66 even as humanitarian law itself constitutes a body of princi-
ples that "substantively should, methodologically can, and morally must
reach 'wars with terror.' "67
The question his argument regarding the nature of humanitarian
law most immediately raises is by what authority he asserts the truth and
general applicability of this "incorporative universality of humanitarian
law." His response invokes as foundational the authority of "logical and
linguistic necessity. '68 It is, in his view, logically and linguistically
incoherent for the United States to establish military tribunals to try al
Qaeda and al Qaeda's allies for violations of the laws of war even as it
declares the laws of war inapplicable to this conflict. The Bush adminis-
tration cannot label the attacks of September 11 war crimes and ground
its response in international conventions and declarations even as it
simultaneously denies the reach of those very same instruments to our
own conduct in this conflict.
While Culbertson's contentions place him in very good company,69
65. Tucker Culbertson, The Constitution, the Camps & the Humanitarian Fifth Amendment,
62 U. MiAmi L. REV. 307, 336 (2008).
66. Id. at 337.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 338.
69. See, for example, Justices Souter and Ginsberg's concurrence in part and dissent in part in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where they said this regarding the administration's efforts to ground its
claimed authority to subject Hamdi to indefinite executive detention on the laws of war:
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
I do not believe that the "incorporative universality of humanitarian law"
that he advocates is a matter of linguistic or logical necessity, but that it
is instead a political commitment to the repudiation of imperial power.
There is nothing incoherent or illogical (which is not to say immoral)
about empire, and empire can and historically has declared principles
applicable to others, even as it declares itself outside or above the law it
imposes on others. That indeed is the essence of sovereignty-the
power to stand outside the law even as it declares what the law will be
for its subjects. Given that, in my view, the "incorporative universality
of humanitarian law" presupposes and depends upon a political commit-
ment to the repudiation of imperial power, I question the substantive and
strategic value of grounding the incorporation of humanitarian law, even
its most universal and transcendental formulations, in the "incorporative
humanitarianism of the Fifth Amendment."
Though the failure of our Supreme Court to give domestic effect to
international humanitarian law will no doubt produce incalculable harm
to the stature of the United States in the international system, and though
the Supreme Court has from time to time considered and cited interna-
tional human rights law in articulating doctrines of constitutional law,70
our history of conquest and empire provides compelling evidence that
high principles of universal justice and natural law-not to mention at
times even the imperatives of positive law-have not fared well when
invoked against the sovereign power of conquest in the courts of the
conqueror. 7' Asserting that all detainees have a claim under the Fifth
[T]he government.., repeatedly argues that Hamdi's detention amounts to nothing
more than customary detention of a captive taken on the field of battle ... [T]he
Government's stated legal position in its campaign against the Taliban (among
whom Hamdi was allegedly captured) is apparently at odds with its claim here to be
acting in accordance with customary law of war.
542 U.S. 507, 549 (2004). Secretary of State Colin Powell similarly grounded objections to an
across-the-board presidential determination that the Geneva Convention did not apply to the
conflict in Afghanistan on the grounds that such a determination would "undermine the
protections of the law of war for our troops" as well as undermining "the President's Military
Order by removing an important legal basis for trying the detainees before Military
Commissions." Memorandum of Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President and Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9, at 122.
70. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (contrasting a European case to a
previous Supreme Court decision).
71. For an example, see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), in which the
Court rebuffed efforts by the Cherokee Nation to invoke its original jurisdiction to challenge the
State of Georgia's abrogation of its treaty rights as a Contract Clause violation. In response,
Justice Johnson remarked,
What [do the Cherokee] allegations exhibit but a state of war, and the fact of
invasion? ... [T]he contest is distinctly a contest for empire. It is not a case of
meum and tuum in the judicial but in the political sense. Not an appeal to laws but
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Amendment for redress of violations of the minimum and fundamental
protections of humanitarian law is certainly a defensible aspiration, but
saying so doesn't make it so. This is not to say that the project to incor-
porate humanitarian law by way of the Fifth Amendment is unworthy or
misguided, it is only to say that its full realization will, in my view and
as a matter of political reality, require a prior repudiation of imperial
power by the political branches of government, achieved either through
the agency of an awakened electorate or at the command of some inter-
national legal tribunal or political coalition backed by superior sovereign
power. This is particularly likely to be so in instances where the consol-
idation and deployment of imperial power is the combined work product
of the President and Congress acting in concert. In such instances, resort
to domestic courts must, in my view, be combined both with the sorts of
grass-roots mobilization efforts Congresswoman Holtzman has advo-
cated,72 as well as with strategies of the sort the New York Center for
Constitutional Rights is deploying to vindicate universal principles of
humanitarian law through foreign courts.7 3
Professors Barnes and Bowman take yet a different approach in
working through the terms of judicial review of executive detentions of
aliens abroad as part of the Global War on Terror. Their objective is to
produce a unified approach that in their view will enable scholars to
develop a common discourse from which to integrate the substantive
commitments and methodological approaches of Law and Economics,
on the one hand, with its emphasis on prioritizing rules of decision that
maximize efficiency by calculating risks and benefits," and the compet-
ing school of legal scholarship, which they identify as Critical Legal
Studies/Critical Race Theory ("CLS/CRT") and to which they attribute
an emphasis on rules of decision that prioritize a commitment to anti-
to force. A case in which a sovereign undertakes to assert his right upon his
sovereign responsibility; to right himself, and not to appeal to any arbiter but the
sword, for the justice of his cause. . . . In the exercise of sovereign right, the
sovereign is sole arbiter of his own justice. The penalty or wrong is war and
subjugation.
id. at 28-29. See also Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, in which Chief Justice Marshall
noted this about the "transcendent" property rights of Native American peoples to the land they
inhabited: "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the
private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted." 21 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
72. See Holtzman, supra note 18 (mapping out a series of steps ordinary Americans can
pursue to produce political change).
73. Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Donald Rumsfeld Charged with Torture
During Trip to France (Oct. 26, 2007), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroomlpress-releases/donald-
rumsfeld-charged-torture-during-trip-france.
74. Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a
Method To Reduce Madness in Post-9/Jl Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 U. MIAMI L. Rev.
373-74 (2008).
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subordination social justice.75
To achieve their unified approach, the authors posit four alternative
rules of decision through which judicial review of executive detentions
might be legally organized.76 These four alternatives represent positions
reflected in ongoing debates over the terms of detainee access to the writ
of habeas corpus. The authors arrange the four alternatives along a con-
tinuum in which the first rule of decision is grounded on a broad inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager.7
There, the Court held that enemy aliens, captured, tried, and imprisoned
outside the United States could not obtain writs of habeas corpus from
the federal courts to challenge their convictions for war crimes under the
Fifth Amendment. The rule of decision at the other end of Barnes and
Bowman's continuum marks the opposite position in which the Fifth
Amendment and Suspension Clause of Article I mandate judicial review
of all detentions under U.S. authority regardless of the nationality of the
detainee or the location of detention. In between these two positions, the
authors identify rules of decision based on the concept of "de facto sov-
ereignty" and "statutory jurisdiction."
After laying out these four alternatives, the authors proceed to
examine each alternative rule of decision in light of the substantive com-
mitments and methodological approaches of the two competing schools
of legal scholarship they posit. Viewed through the lens of Law and
Economics, the authors assert that the preferred rule of decision would
be one that concentrates power in the executive branch, including the
power to detain and try suspected alien enemy combatants without judi-
cial interference. The reason for this result is that "[u]nder emergency
conditions, the security benefits to be gained by concentrating power in
the Executive are presumed to outweigh the risk of misusing power,"78
while the "cost[s] involved in the judiciary erroneously ordering the
release of an al Qaeda member is enormous .... Balanced against these
costs, the increased liberty gained through judicial review can be seen as
negligible."7 9 Viewed, by contrast, through the lens of CLS/CRT, the
preferred rule of decision would provide a judicial forum for reviewing
the legality of executive detentions without distinctions based on nation-
ality or location of detention. This is because the commitment to social
justice and antisubordination attributed to CLS/CRT grounds the legiti-
macy of U.S. power on its recognition of universal human dignity and
its commitment to substantive equality for the socially disempowered.
75. Id. at 401.
76. Id. at 377-80.
77. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
78. Barnes & Bowman, supra note 74, at 382.
79. Id. at 385.
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At the end of their efforts to develop a "unified approach" with
which to examine the tradeoffs of justice and efficiency at stake in each
competing rule of decision, the authors conclude that they are left in the
same position they started-agreeing to disagree. In my view, this is not
a surprising result. The cost-benefit analysis at the center of Law and
Economics methodology reflects a utilitarian perspective in which indi-
vidual rights are not fundamental, but contingent and negotiable for the
sake of the "greater good" posited by theory's practitioners. 80  The
authors' "unified approach" seeks to de-center simplistic calculations of
costs and benefits attributable to the different rules of decision through
which judicial review of executive detentions in the War on Terror
might be provided (or not). Though the authors examine these alterna-
tives in light of a series of variables, none of their chosen variables puts
the fundamental humanity of the detainees at the center of the analysis. 81
Professor Schnably's contribution illustrates yet another approach
to dealing with the constitutional challenges implicated by the aggres-
sive assertion of "inherent" executive powers underlying the array of
practices and policies that have come to define the Bush administration's
global War on Terror.8" Like Culbertson, Schnably argues that interna-
tional law is not only a central, but also a superior and foundational
source of authority for the articulation of constitutional doctrine. How-
ever, Professor Schnably's contribution focuses on the institutions, prac-
tices, and regimes through which international law has developed
democratic norms that implicate the internal structures of constitutional
government. In so doing, the piece provides a rather profound and
extended "glimpse" into how the international community might be
called to weigh-in in the event that an American Decider might one day
decide to suspend our Constitution.
In his detailed and scholarly piece, Schnably challenges the
assumption that domestic law supplies all the relevant answers to consti-
tutional questions regarding the scope of executive power, the role of the
courts, and the separation of powers. Over and again, Schnably finds
compelling evidence linking the structure of constitutional government
to the articulation of international law. Indeed, even the case most often
80. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, Inter!
National Labor Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MiAMi L. REV.
575, 652-53 (1999).
81. The authors suggest that under their unified approach the rule of decision preferred is the
rule that will: "(1) maximize participation by the three branches of government; (2) provide clear
and predictable rules; (3) identify substantive norms to guide government action or judicial review
or both; and (4) allocate the burden of legislative inaction on the party best positioned to
overcome it." Barnes & Bowman, supra note 74, at 412.
82. Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure
and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417 (2008).
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cited in support of expansive executive power in the field of foreign
affairs grounds its assertions of executive power in international law. In
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,83 the Supreme Court
asserted that the authority for executive power over foreign affairs was
not vested through, nor dependent on, the Constitution, but was instead
grounded in international rules recognizing the independence and sover-
eignty of the nation-state.84 The Bush administration's repeated asser-
tions of Article II "inherent powers" are substantially grounded in an
ever-enlarging interpretation of the Curtiss-Wright precedent in the
wake of September 11; however, in a brilliant reading, Schnably shines
a powerful light on the future paths that this domestic appeal to interna-
tional law for authoritative norms to determine the scope of executive
power might one day be fashioned into taking. In particular, Schnably
ponders aloud "what it would mean to imagine a world in which the
President's claims of inherent authority to detain civilians might be
tested against, for example, the provisions of the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter, adopted by the Organization of American States in
2001."85
Schnably notes post-World War II changes in international law and
regional arrangements pointing in this direction-most notably the
emergent norms in international human rights law, in which individual
and collective human rights trump traditional views of sovereign impu-
nity. As Schnably rightly notes, certain human rights such as the right to
an independent tribunal and the rights to democracy and representative
government arguably constrain the way a state may establish the struc-
tural relationship between the branches of government and the scope of
independence that the state's courts must enjoy in order to meet the stan-
dards established by international law.86 Notably, the Charter of Paris,
adopted in 1990, declared that "Democracy has as its foundation respect
for the human person and the rule of law."8 7 This link between democ-
racy and the rule of law is further linked by the Charter to constitutional-
ism: "Democracy, with its representative and pluralist character, entails
accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to
comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will
be above the law."88
Indeed, Professor Schnably's significant contribution is to highlight
83. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
84. Schnably, supra note 82, at 427-28.
85. Id. at 431.
86. Id. at 436-41.
87. Id. at 439 (quoting Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 194)
(emphasis added).
88. Id. at 440 (quoting Charter of Paris for a New Europe, at 194) (emphasis added).
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the many ways in which international treaties, instruments, and organi-
zations have increasingly linked the rule of law to representative democ-
racy and constitutionalism, making the internal legal structures of
democracy a matter of international concern. He focuses specifically on
the efforts in this area of three regional organizations: the Organization
of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, and the African Union.89 He notes, for example, the OAS's
Charter Amendment in 1992, which provides that a member state
"whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by
force may be suspended" and further proclaims that the "unconstitu-
tional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the
Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation
of that state's government in the Summit of the Americas process."90
Similarly, the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted in 2001 by
the OAS provides that maintenance of the rule of law, the separation of
powers, and the independence of the branches of government are essen-
tial to any democracy. The Charter "prohibits any 'unconstitutional
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the demo-
cratic order in a member state."' 91
Similarly, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE") has proclaimed the importance of "a clear separation between
the State and political parties, 92 while the 2007 meeting of its Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ("ODIHR") emphasized the
need to "prevent[ ] an over-concentration of powers in the executive
branch;" 93 to ensure national legislatures have the "authority to effec-
tively represent the citizenry and oversee the executive;" 94 and to pro-
scribe any "de facto imposition ... of a state of emergency" that is not
imposed in accordance with law.95 This specific restraint on extra-con-
stitutional moves in a "state of emergency" is echoed by the U.N.
89. Id. at 441-57.
90. Id. at 445 (quoting the Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, Can., Apr. 22, 2001,
Declaration of Quebec City, available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/59660.htm).
91. Id. at 431-32 (quoting Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic
Charter art. 19, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001)).
92. Id. at 446 (quoting Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, Den.
June 5-29, 1990, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, 5.4 (June 29, 1990).
93. Id. at 449 n.152 (quoting Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,
Permanent Council, Address by Ambassador Christian Strohal, Director of the OSCE Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 685th Session of the Permanent Council,
ODIHR.GAL/88/07, at 3 (Oct. 30, 2007)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 449 (quoting Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Moscow
Meeting on the Human Dimension, Moscow, Russ., Oct. 3, 1991, 28.4, reprinted in 30 I.L.M.
1670, 1683 (1991)).
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Human Rights Committee.96
Schnably also notes important developments in Africa that reflect
increased regional attention to the internal constitutional arrangements
of member states in the Organization of African Unity.97 In 2000 OAU
member states met in Lom6, Togo. In adopting the Constitutive Act of
the African Union, the heads of state at the Lom6 meeting issued a "Sol-
emn Declaration" affirming, among other things, the obligation of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government to "respect
their national constitutions and adhere to the provisions of the law and
other legislative enactments promulgated by National Assemblies. No
one should be exempted from accountability. 98 In addition, heads of
state at the Lom6 meeting approved the Declaration on the Framework
for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government,
which defined specific situations constituting unconstitutional changes
of government and committed member states, in the event of such a
situation, to "press for a return to constitutional order through means
including suspension of the state's membership and the imposition of
sanctions."99
To be sure, Schnably is fully aware of, and seeks to illustrate
through two revealing case studies, the pitfalls and possibilities latent in
the project of invigorating the application of international enforcement
mechanisms to member-states' internal structures of democracy. His
case studies of the political crises in Nicaragua and Togo demonstrate
that the institutions and procedures of international (and regional) law
are a ways away from providing the kinds of substantive norms and
institutional responses one might imagine necessary to prevent the
world's only remaining super-power from a constitutional free-fall.
Nevertheless, these case studies illuminate the increasingly significant
role international and regional organizations are playing in the effort to
make fidelity to the internal legal structures of constitutional govern-
ment a matter of international concern.
Professor Corn's article takes up the issue of an amendment to the
UCMJ 1°° inserted into the National Defense Authorization Act of
2007.1° 1 The amendment, inserted by Senator Lindsay Graham, was
96. Schnably, supra note 82 at 450.
97. Id. 451-57.
98. Id. at 452-53 (quoting OAU, CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, 11(A), OAU DOC. AHG/
Decl. 4 (XXXVI) (July 10-12, 2000), available at www.africa-union.org/Special-Programs/CSS
DCA/cssdca-solemndeclaration.pdf).
99. Id. at 454.
100. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2000).
101. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A Proposal
for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian
Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI. L. Rv. 491 (2008).
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apparently enacted without discussion, debate, or even much notice. 0 2
The provision makes a seemingly small but profoundly significant
change to Article 2 of the UCMJ. 1°3 Before the 2007 amendment, the
UCMJ applied to civilians accompanying armed forces in the field only
in cases of declared war.' 4 As Corn notes, this interpretation of Article
2(a)(10) established "what is best described as the de facto immunity
from military-criminal jurisdiction that civilians accompanying the
armed forces in operational areas enjoy."'0 5 This is because Congress
has not formally declared war against any nation-state since World War
II.1°6 Accordingly, prior to the 2007 amendment, civilian military con-
tractors operating in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and else-
where were not subject to the military's court-martial jurisdiction under
Article 2(a)(10) because these operations were not authorized by a con-
gressional declaration of war.
Informed observers of news reports on the war in Iraq will surely
have noticed that the difficulty of holding civilians legally accountable
for even gross misconduct has become an increasingly serious problem
as more and more civilians are employed by private for-profit contrac-
tors providing support services to U.S. armed forces in the field. Per-
haps the most egregious example of lawlessness and insubordination
attributed to the legal impunity enjoyed by civilian contractors that sup-
port military operations in Iraq involves the alleged participation of
Titan and CACI International employees in the torture scandal at Abu
Ghraib. 10 7 According to a 2004 article in the Washington Post, an Army
report investigating the scandal at Abu Ghraib found that, among other
things,
contract interrogators and linguists were involved in 16 of the 44
102. Id. at 496.
103. Article 2(a) of the UCMJ delineates the categories of persons subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2000). Prior to passage of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2007, Article 2(a)(10) provided for military jurisdiction "in time of war"
over civilians "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field." 10 U.S.C.
§ 802(a)(10) (emphasis added). The amendment inserted into the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2007 changed Article 2(a)(10) to read "In time of declared war or a contigency operation,
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field." John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083,
2217 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (emphasis added)).
104. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970).
105. Corn, supra note 101, at 491.
106. Some have argued that Congress has failed "to maintain strict formality in the separation
of government functions relating to the decision to go to war." J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War,
41 DutE L.J. 27, 33 (1991). It is worth emphasizing that the de facto immunity civilians enjoy
under Article 2(a)(10) is purely a function of this failure. See also infra note 133 and
accompanying text.
107. See Renae Merle & Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees from CACI International, Titan
Referred for Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A 18.
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alleged abuses at the prison. According to the report, an unidentified
CACI interrogator grabbed a prisoner from a vehicle, pulled him to
the ground and dragged him to an interrogation booth as the prisoner
tried to stand. The same CACI employee allegedly drank alcohol at
the prison and refused to take orders from a military officer, saying,
"I have been doing my job for 20 years and do not need a 20-year-old
to tell me how to do my job."10 8
Gross civilian misconduct has also been alleged in other instances,
including an incident involving Blackwater employees who fired on
Iraqi civilians, killing many Iraqis, wounding numerous Iraqis, and trig-
gering demands from the Iraqi government that the company leave the
country. 09
Viewed against this backdrop of increased privatization and civilian
lawlessness, the extension of military court-martial jurisdiction over
civilian military contractors could certainly be perceived as a necessary
and proper means to punish and deter civilian misconduct in the field of
military operations. The 2007 amendment to the UCMJ achieves this
result by expanding the scope of Article 2(a)(10) to provide military
jurisdiction over civilian contractors supporting the armed forces in the
field, not only during a declared war, but during "contingency opera-
tions" as well.1 10
While this amendment may provide military jurisdiction over pri-
vate military contractors in places like Iraq, it also has other effects. As
Professor Corn explains, "the amendment has the effect of subjecting
any civilian-civil servant or contractor-'accompanying' the armed
forces in a deployed location to the jurisdiction of the entire UCMJ,
including the jurisdiction of military courts.""' This may certainly be
one way to address the problem of civilian lawlessness of the sort
alleged against employees of private military contractors such as Black-
water, CACI, and Titan. Corn's concern, however, is that the amend-
ment's broad brush could produce untoward results." 2 This is
especially true given that prior precedents have interpreted the scope of
Article 2(a)(10)'s provision regarding civilians "accompanying the
force" to include not just civilian employees of the armed forces, but
108. Id. It is also worth noting that as of November 13, 2007, none of CACI's employees has
been indicted for any misconduct associated with its work in Iraq. See R. Robin McDonald, Judge
Lets Abu Ghraib Suit Go Forward, 118 FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. 222 (2007).
109. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Tracing the Paths of 5 Who Died in a Storm of Gunfire, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A01; Zachary A. Goldfarb, A Tougher Line on Government Contracting,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at Dl.
110. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)).
I 1. Corn, supra note 101, at 496.
112. See id. at 494.
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journalists, American Red Cross workers, ' 3 and even "U.S. civilians
whose employment with the armed forces had been terminated but who
remained in the theater of operations.""' 4
The prospect of seeing every U.S. citizen in the field of a "contin-
gency operation" subjected to every punitive article in the UCMJ-
including unique military offenses like "disrespect to superiors," "diso-
bedience of orders," "absence without authority," "desertion," and other
similar offenses-raises troubling practical and constitutional issues.' '5
This is, as Professor Corn notes, in no small part because trial by court-
martial means trial without the fundamental rights to which American
citizens subject to federal criminal prosecution are constitutionally enti-
tled." 6 These fundamental rights include the right to be tried in a fed-
eral court presided over by an Article III judge with life tenure and the
right to be charged by grand jury indictment and convicted or acquitted
by the unanimous verdict of a jury of one's peers. ''7 Subjecting civil-
ians to trial by court-martial means subjecting American citizens to trial
before judges who serve at the pleasure of the executive branch and to
conviction by panels of military officers rather than juries of one's peers.
In my view, the 2007 amendment to the UCMJ, which expanded
military jurisdiction over civilians, when read in light of the other contri-
butions to this symposium, provides a startling glimpse into a dystopian
future in which the line between imperial and totalitarian power is quite
thin indeed. Recall, for example, the constitutional debate over the juris-
diction-stripping provision in Section 7 of the MCA, which purports to
deprive Guantdinamo detainees of access to federal habeas jurisdic-
tion." I 8 Arguments supporting the constitutionality of this provision are
premised in part on the notion that, unlike American citizens, noncitizens
do not have extraterritorial constitutional rights against the U.S. govern-
ment. 19 This notion that the Constitution applies and restricts what the
U.S. government can do to American citizens outside U.S. territory hails
back to the Supreme Court's opinion in Reid v. Covert.'2 ° Reid's broad
reasoning, in my view, could well support a determination that Section 7
is unconstitutional, not because the Suspension Clause is a structural
limitation on the power of Congress to suspend the writ of habeas
113. Id. at 518-19.
114. Id. at 518.
115. See id. at 524.
116. Id. at 525-26.
117. Id. at 505.
118. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
119. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078
(2007) ("[T]he Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or presence within
the United States.").
120. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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corpus, but more generally because the federal government, being a
republican (not imperial) form of government, must at all times govern
within constitutional limits.
This interpretation of the constitutional limits on federal power
was, in fact, the position articulated in Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, in which Justice Brennan
invoked the Court's decision in Reid as grounds for holding that non-
resident aliens are protected by the Fourth Amendment"2 ' because they
become part of "the people" whenever they become part of "the gov-
erned." 12 It was Justice Rehnquist's opinion that restricted the scope of
Reid v. Covert to American citizens only and declared that nonresident
aliens have no right to challenge the constitutionality of warrantless
searches conducted by federal officials abroad because they are not part
of "the people." '123 Against this backdrop of precedential devolution, the
quiet enactment of the 2007 amendment to the UCMJ expands military
jurisdiction over American citizens accompanying our armed forces in
contingency operations and provides chilling insight into the dynamic of
self-inflicted "necessity," through which the asserted power to govern,
outside constitutional limits, persons who are not part of "the people"
can assume, for itself, a power asserted against "the people" as well-
Reid v. Covert notwithstanding.
Professor Corn might not agree with my characterization of the
practical problems underlying the need that he sees for some sort of
military jurisdiction over civilians-perhaps the summary court martial
and opt-out provisions he advocates in his article-as a "self-inflicted
necessity." This is because his analysis proceeds on the assumption that
privatization and the increasing participation of civilians in the business
of war is a foregone conclusion. 124  Civilians have accompanied the
armed forces in operational areas as far back as the Revolutionary
War. 125 Since the end of the Cold War, military downsizing has meant
outsourcing more and more soldier work and that trend, in his view, is
121. 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 284. According to Justice Brennan,Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections:
He has become, quite literally, one of the governed. Fundamental fairness and the
ideals underlying our Bill of Rights compel the conclusion that when we impose
"societal obligations," such as the obligation to comply with our criminal laws, on
foreign nationals, we in turn are obliged to respect certain correlative rights, among
them the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
123. See id. at 269-70 (distinguishing Reid, and making it inapplicable to Verdugo-Urquidez's
Fourth Amendment claim).
124. See Corn, supra note 101, at 492 & n.6.
125. Id. at 501.
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unlikely to reverse. 2  In light of this practical reality and the impunity
and disorder occasioned by civilian lawlessness and insubordination,
military commanders need tools to bring civilian contractors under mili-
tary discipline.
To be sure, Professor Corn's analysis does seek to weigh the com-
peting interests, 27 but, in my view, it is worth noting that military solu-
tions to civilian disorder, corruption, and mismanagement have played a
significant role in the history of transitions from democracy to dictator-
ship. When the Argentine military overthrew the government of "Isabe-
lita" Peron in March of 1976, the change in government was called the
"Gentlemen's Coup" and the military junta was received by the country
as the "new authorities" who would bring order out of the chaos of eco-
nomic crisis and domestic unrest. 28 That coup began what has since
become known as the "Dirty War," in which Argentine citizens were
"disappeared" and tortured in a network of detention centers and con-
centration camps scattered throughout the country as part of the junta's
effort to root out and destroy the hidden internal enemy that threatened
the security of the nation.
29
The 2007 amendment to the UCMJ is not, by any means, a military
coup, but it does provide a window into a dystopian future in which
American constitutional values and principles are quietly, but steadily,
chipped away in order to provide "practical solutions" to problems cre-
ated by prior violations of constitutional values and principles.
30
Recall, for example, that the "de facto immunity" for which the amend-
ment is a proffered solution is itself a result of Congress's failure since
World War II to confine the country's war making activity within the
boundaries established by its expressly enumerated power to "declare
war.' 31 From this perspective, the quiet passage of the 2007 amend-
ment to the UCMJ should sound major alarms. Not only has Congress
passed a law that profoundly alters the scope of constitutional rights that
American citizens enjoy against executive power abroad, but it has done
so apparently without discussion, debate, or notice. Additionally, the
changed legal landscape confronting American citizens abroad is no
126. See Bernd Debusmann, War Is Also Taking a Toll on Contractors: At Least 647 Support
Personnel Killed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 12, 2006.
127. Corn, supra note 101, at 520.
128. See MARGUERITE FErrLOWrz, A LEXICON OF TERROR: ARGENTINA AND THE LEGACIES OF
TORTURE 6-7 (1998).
129. Id. at 8.
130. See Michael Smith & Sarah Baxter, US Generals 'Will Quit' If Bush Orders Iran Attack,
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 2007, at 22 (reporting that some of the country's most senior
military commanders are prepared to resign if the White House orders a military strike against
Iran).
131. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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longer limited to wars declared by Congress; it now applies to any "con-
tingency operation" the President might unilaterally decide to launch in
the exercise of his commander-in-chief powers.
132
In my view, such alterations in the fundamental constitutional
rights enjoyed by American citizens should, as a matter of separation of
powers, require at minimum a formal declaration of war by the Con-
gress. This may seem "anachronistic," "archaic," or "unrealistic" given
that Congress has, since World War II, preferred to fund "low intensity
conflicts" rather than formally declared wars. 133 However, in my view,
the quiet passage of this amendment is compelling evidence that a Con-
gress that willingly abdicates its constitutional responsibility to protect
the nation from ill-advised presidential deployments of our armed forces
in foreign military adventures by failing, among other things, to jeal-
ously guard its expressly enumerated power to declare war, can hardly
be expected to jealously guard the constitutional rights of American citi-
zens against executive overreaching.
This is not to say that the problem of civilian lawlessness in the
field of "contingency operations" is not a compelling problem in need of
immediate solution. It is to say that the lessons offered by the excellent
contributions to this symposium point in directions very different from
the solution proffered by the 2007 amendment to the UCMJ. These
solutions require high-level accountability of the sort Congresswoman
Holtzman advocates for the lies and misrepresentations that have led the
country to war in the first place. 134 They also require investigation and
prosecution of the network of interlocking interests that allegedly have
corrupted the serious matter of national security and converted war into
a for-profit business for the benefit of a transnational network of eco-
nomic and political elites,' 35 retired generals,136 and party operatives.1
37
132. See, e.g., Gene Healy, War with Iraq: Who Decides?, CATO INST., Feb. 26, 2002, http:ll
www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=3405 (criticizing Congress's failure to put the decision to
commit armed forces to Iraq to an up or down vote on a formal declaration of war).
133. See Sidak, supra note 106, at 94; see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow:
Marking Intersections in and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and
Latinalo Critical Legal Theory, 40 B.C. L. REV. 349, 367-68 (1998) (noting the role of "low-
intensity conflicts" in the realization of American national-security ideology and the creation of
common contexts of struggle for articulating intersections in and between LatCrit and APACrit
legal scholarship).
134. Holtzman, supra note 18, at 227.
135. See A Halliburton Primer, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/onpolitics/articles/halliburtonprimer.html; see also Maggie Mulvihill et al., Bush Advisers
Cashed in on Saudi Gravy Train, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 11, 2001, at 7; The Carlyle Group, http:ll
www.apfn.org/apfn/Carlyle-group.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (exploring links between high
level government officials and the profits of the defense-contract industry).
136. See, e.g., William M. Arkin, Microwaves, Lasers, Retired Generals for Sale, WASH. POST,
Oct. 6, 2005, http:nlintegrator.hanscom.af.mil/2005/October/10132005/10132005-07.htm.
137. See, e.g., Blackwater Runs Red, http://iraqforsale.bravenewfilms.org/blog/344-black
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Read cumulatively, as a body of scholarship, the articles and essays
in this symposium demonstrate the wide range of issues implicated by
the Bush administration's repeated assertion of Article II of the U.S.
Constitution as legal authority for the policies, practices, and institu-
tional rearrangements through which it is prosecuting its war, not on a
nation-state with which the country might one day conclude a treaty of
peace, but rather on terror. The Bush administration's assertions that its
global War on Terror is a "new kind of war," over and again, provide
shorthand sound bites for unprecedented claims of inherent executive
powers. These claims of inherent executive power challenge traditional
understandings of individual rights and republican government. They
manipulate and destabilize foundational distinctions between criminal
acts and acts of war, between citizen and noncitizen, between domestic
and international, chipping away the line between constitutional govern-
ment and the state of exception, between the rule of law and the politics
of "necessity," between inevitable discretion and lawless impunity.
Starting with Congresswoman Holtzman's important contribution
exploring the constitutional foundations and contemporary justifications
for invoking impeachment proceedings against the President, the sympo-
sium articles reveal historical parallels that significantly undercut the
idea that the War on Terror is a "new" kind of war. To the extent it is
prosecuted through warrantless domestic surveillance, disinformation
directed, not at foreign enemies, but at the American people, and bomb-
ing campaigns against civilian populations, whose deaths are discounted
as collateral damage justified by military necessity, the Bush administra-
tion's War on Terror is not new, but bares remarkable similarities to the
Nixon administration's War on Communism. To the extent it is prose-
cuted through torture and secret detention centers, the War on Terror
calls to mind practices of racial terror and colonial domination that are
also decidedly not new.
Against this backdrop of familiar abuses, the symposium authors
demonstrate the abundance of established legal doctrines and traditions
that our history of struggle to establish and maintain a government of
laws, under the rule of law, both domestically and internationally, has
bequeathed to the American experiment in enlightened self-government.
These articles show us why the notion that American separation of pow-
ers doctrine and the sovereignty of the people of the United States
reflected in and effectuated by this doctrine will be thrown to the waste
water-runs-red (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (documenting extensive relationship between
Blackwater principals and Republican party); see also Joshua Frank, Senator Feinstein's War
Profiteering, ANTIWAR.COM, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.antiwar.com/frank/?articleid=8609
(arguing that war profiteering conflicts are a bipartisan problem).
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basket of our future's history by the actions and utterances of a self-
proclaimed "Decider" is neither warranted nor inevitable. They show us
why notions that international human rights and emerging norms regard-
ing the right of all peoples to democratic government under the rule of
law must give way to the expanding assertions of imperial power extra-
territorially and totalitarian power domestically are neither warranted
nor inevitable. In the words of Senator Feingold, whose call for censure
inspired me to organize the conference documented by this symposium
volume, "[w]e can fight terrorism without breaking the law. The rule of
law is central to who we are as a people, and the President must return to
the law." '138
138. An Examination of the Call To Censure the President, supra note 2 (statement of Senator
Russ Feingold, Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
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